need to declare that the following content does not constitute legal advice, but only provides a theoretical defense idea. In actual cases, qualified lawyers must make judgments and operations based on specific circumstances. In this case, you can consider defending around the two core points of "motive" and "actual harm": 1. Emphasize legitimate motives a. Explain that the client's original intention was out of concern for the company's information security protection mechanism, and believes that by detecting the difficulty of extracting sensitive data, it can help the company expose and repair potential vulnerabilities, thereby improving the overall security protection level. b. Suggest that the client had no malicious intent before the behavior (or during the behavior), such as no intention to use the data for illegal profit, leakage or other destructive purposes, but hoped to help the company discover security risks in advance through "security testing" or "vulnerability mining". c. If there is evidence that the client has tried or later actively contacted the relevant department of the company, indicating that it has given timely feedback after discovering the problem, or there is other evidence to support that its behavior is a disclosure behavior in good faith, it can further prove that it is not out of malicious theft of secrets, but for the purpose of network security audit. 2. Demonstrate that the actual harm is small a. Emphasize that the client did not use the acquired data for illegal transactions, public disclosure or other activities that are detrimental to the interests of the company. b. Discuss that the client’s actions, although unauthorized, are “post-disclosure” in nature, and are intended to improve information protection capabilities, which in the long run can help the company avoid a wider range of data leakage risks. c. Detailed description of the measures taken by the client in the process of obtaining data: whether it is limited to reading (not copying, disseminating or tampering), and whether the operation is carried out under the premise of minimizing the scope of interference, thereby reducing the substantial harm to the company’s operations and data security. 3. Raise institutional and authorization issues a. Arguing whether the company’s information security mechanism has protection loopholes in design and operation or does not clearly specify authorization terms, this may also reflect a broader issue: in the field of information security, effective “white hat” testing usually requires a clear institutional framework and authorization. If the company does not have a sufficiently sound security testing mechanism, it is difficult to expect external hackers or “tester” to act in full accordance with legal procedures. b. If the client has some signs that the information system security disclaimer is vague or the protection measures are insufficient before entering the system and obtaining data, this can also be used to prove that its behavior is not traditional “theft” behavior, but a “good faith test” made in an environment without clear definitions. 4. Leniency in laws and policies a. It can be argued that the current cybersecurity field is facing complex legal and technical challenges. From a macro perspective, moderate tolerance of "good faith mining" behavior is conducive to promoting companies and society to pay attention to security risks. (It should be noted that many jurisdictions will seriously characterize unauthorized system access, but it is possible to strive for the judge to consider its subjective motivation and actual consequences when sentencing.) b. If it can be proved that the client actively cooperates with the company after the behavior is completed and assists in fixing the vulnerability, then this cooperative attitude can reduce its responsibility to a certain extent. It should be noted that: 1. Although the logic of the defense may be ethically reasonable, "unauthorized access to confidential data" usually constitutes a criminal act in law, so the focus of the defense is how to make the court fully consider the client's motivation for good faith detection and the smaller actual damage in sentencing and liability determination. 2. The ultimate success or failure of the case still depends on sufficient and convincing evidence to prove the client's true intentions and the details of the actual behavior in the process. 3. Different regions and countries have different legal provisions for "security testing behavior". Some jurisdictions may not even recognize the so-called "good faith testing" as a legitimate defense, so a comprehensive judgment must be made in combination with the local legal environment. In short, the defense strategy can be carried out from four angles: positive portrayal of the client's subjective motivation, detailed proof of actual harm, revelation of loopholes in the company's information security system, and response to the policy tolerance background. But at the same time, it must be emphasized that any unauthorized system access behavior is highly controversial in law. The defense strategy should carefully consider the possible legal risks and try to get the judge or jury to show tolerance for "good faith security testing" when sentencing.