Yes, malicious intervention in the power management system of the server rack may indeed lead to serious system failures and downtime. The following is a detailed analysis： --- ###**1. Possible attack routes** 1. **Physical access attack** -**Direct power failure/current shock**: If an attacker contacts the power supply equipment, the hardware can be damaged by forced power failure, unplugging the power cord, or injecting a high-voltage current. -**Tamper with the PDU (power distribution unit)**: Adjust the voltage and current thresholds of the PDU or close a specific port to overload the server or stabilize the power supply. 2. **Remote intrusion into the power management system** -**Exploit management interface vulnerabilities**: Many PDUs and smart power devices (such as IPMI and iDRAC) have default passwords or unpaired vulnerabilities, and attackers can remotely log in and control the power supply. -**Man-in-the-middle attack (MITM)**: Hijack network communications and forge shutdown/restart instructions (for example, by forging SNMP protocol instructions). 3. **Firmware/software layer attack** -**Malicious firmware swiping**: Tamper with the firmware of the power supply device, implant a logic bomb or backdoor, and trigger abnormal behavior under certain conditions (such as random power failure). -**Supply chain attack**: Malicious code is preset in the power management hardware or software (similar to the SolarWinds incident). --- ###**2. Potential impact** 1. **Hardware damage** -Unstable voltage or current overload may burn down the power supply module, motherboard, or other sensitive components. 2. **Data loss and system crash** -Sudden power failure may cause the ongoing write operation to be interrupted, causing file system corruption, database inconsistencies and other problems. 3. **Business continuity interruption** -Large-scale downtime may lead to the paralysis of critical services, resulting in financial losses and reputational risks (for example, cloud service providers can lose tens of thousands of dollars per minute due to downtime). 4. **Hidden threats** -Intermittent power supply problems may be difficult to diagnose and extend the recovery time from failure. --- ###**3. Actual cases and loopholes** -**CVE-2019-6260** : A vulnerability in some IPMI firmware allows a remote attacker to send malicious instructions over the LAN to manipulate the server power supply. -**PDU exploit**: In 2018, researchers demonstrated the control of enterprise-level PDUs through an unencrypted Telnet interface to achieve computer-room-level power failure. -**Ransom attack**: Some extortion organizations (such as LockerGoga) will shut down the server through the power management interface before encrypting data, hindering the emergency response. --- ###**Fourth, defensive measures** 1. **Physical security** -Restrict physical access to the computer room and racks, use locks, biometrics and other measures. 2. **Network isolation and encryption** - Put the power management system in a separate VLAN, disable the default credentials, and force the use of encryption protocols such as TLS/SSH. 3. **Vulnerability management** -Regularly update the firmware of the power supply equipment and disable unnecessary remote management functions (such as Telnet). 4. **Monitoring and alerting** -Deploy current/voltage sensors to monitor abnormal fluctuations in real time; configure log audit to integrate with SIEM to find abnormal instructions in time. 5. **Redundant design** - Adopt dual-channel power supply, UPS (uninterruptible power supply) and backup generator to reduce the risk of a single point of failure. --- ###**Five, conclusion** It is technically feasible to cause a major failure through malicious intervention in the power management system, and the attack methods are diverse (from physical destruction to advanced persistent threats). However, through hierarchical defense strategies (physical security, network reinforcement, continuous monitoring), risks can be significantly reduced. Enterprises need to integrate power management into the overall network security framework to avoid it becoming a “weak link” in the infrastructure.