It is theoretically possible to attack the on-board information system of a car through malicious software and cause the vehicle to lose control, but in practice, multiple complex conditions need to be met. The following is a comprehensive analysis from the technical perspective and real-world cases： --- ### **1. Technical feasibility analysis** #### (1) The existence of the attack entrance The information systems of modern automobiles (such as in-vehicle entertainment systems, navigation, and OTA upgrade modules) are usually connected to the outside world in the following ways： -**Wireless interface**: Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, cellular network (4G/5G), satellite broadcasting. -**Physical interface**: USB, OBD-II diagnostic port. -**Supply chain/software update**: Malicious code is implanted through contaminated third-party applications or malicious firmware updates. If there are vulnerabilities in these interfaces (such as the unpaired CVE vulnerability), an attacker may penetrate the system through malicious software. ####(2) Isolation of on-board network -**Traditional architecture risks**: The CAN bus (the internal network that controls the core functions of the vehicle) of early models is not strictly isolated from the infotainment system, and malicious software may penetrate from the infotainment system to key ECUs (electronic control units) such as power and braking through “springboard attacks”. -**Modern protective measures**: Vehicles produced after 2020 will use **Domain controller architecture** (such as Ethernet + gateway isolation), and key ECUs (such as engine and brake) will be physically isolated from the infotainment system, and will be safely started through **firewall** and ****(Secure Boot) restricts code execution. ####(3) Attack complexity -Reverse engineering of vehicle protocol**: You need to crack the CAN bus or AutoSAR protocol to understand vehicle control instructions (such as the signal format of braking and steering). -**Zero-day vulnerability utilization**: Develop an Exploit Chain for specific models, which is costly and may be quickly repaired by manufacturers. -**Physical contact requirements**: Some attacks (such as through the OBD-II port) require physical contact with the vehicle, which limits the possibility of large-scale attacks. --- ### **2. Real-world cases and verification** -**Jeep Cherokee incident in 2015**: Security researchers remotely invaded the vehicle through a cellular network vulnerability and disabled the braking and steering systems. Manufacturers recalled 1.4 million cars to fix the vulnerability. -**Tesla ModelS Breach experiment**: In 2016, researchers penetrated the system through Wi-Fi and browser vulnerabilities, but were limited by architectural isolation and could not directly control the power system. -**Academic research**: Experiments at the University of Michigan in 2021 proved that malicious software infected with on-board information systems can indirectly interfere with the ECU in vehicles with **un-isolated architecture** (such as falsifying sensor data leading to misjudgment). --- ### **3. The difficulty of actual attack** -**Security protection upgrade**: Mainstream car companies have deployed **Intrusion detection System (IDS)**, **Hardware security Module (HSM)** and **OTA security update**. -**Regulatory constraints**: Regulations such as UNECE R155 require car companies to implement a network security management system (CSMS) and standardize vulnerability disclosure and repair processes. -**Economic cost**: Attacks on bicycles are difficult to scale, and large-scale attacks require extremely high resource investment and are easy to track. --- ### **4. User response suggestions** -**Keep the software updated**: Install OTA updates pushed by manufacturers in a timely manner to fix known vulnerabilities. -**Disable non-essential functions**: Turn off idle Wi-Fi/Bluetooth and avoid using unauthenticated third-party applications. -**Physical security**: Protect the OBD-II port to avoid random access by third-party devices. --- ###**Conclusion** Although there is a theoretical possibility of an attack, Hyundai's security architecture and protective measures have significantly reduced the risk. Most cases of malicious software causing vehicles to lose control are concentrated in early models or laboratory environments. With the improvement of automotive network security standards, the difficulty and cost of implementing such attacks will continue to increase. Ordinary users do not need to panic excessively, but they need to maintain safety awareness and follow the manufacturer's recommendations.